

DANCING ON THE SAME SPOT

SURVEY REPORT ON
**CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS
AND EXPECTATIONS**

Tendai Murisa,
Judith Natsai T. Kushata
and Tongesayi Rwapunga

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1. Introduction

In the period leading to the 2018 general elections Zimbabweans were subjected to a frenzy of promises on how different political parties, if elected, would change their circumstance. We have been tracking how the promises made by ZANU-PF during the elections have been converted into policy programmes. The process of tracking also entails talking to citizens to gauge their perceptions on how government is performing in converting the promises made during the campaign. In this report we present findings from a nation-wide survey carried out in November and December 2019. The survey sought to understand the extent to which government's (local and central) actions were informed by the interconnected social, economic and political crises (see Table 1). It also sought to understand how government's priorities match citizens' expectations. The report is divided into three main sections; the first part provides a broad overview of what is taking place at the national level in terms of government's initiatives, the second part discusses the findings from the field in a more detailed manner and the final part provides a conclusion and suggestions on what could be done to resolve the growing chasm between what government does and what citizens expect it to do.

There is no good news coming out of Zimbabwe at the moment. The newspaper headlines are mostly focused on; allegations of corruption in high offices, rumours of squabbles amongst political leaders in the two major parties, collapse of social service delivery and a sense of despair. The bromance between citizens and the 'new' leadership in the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) seems to have quickly died down and, in its place, we have returned to high levels of mistrust and a gridlock on how to proceed. The major parties have defaulted to blame shifting- ZANU-PF seems to be shifting all the blame on sanctions. The Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-A) is also not taking responsibility for the challenges on delivering the smart cities promise, the mantra has shifted to- 'it is all because of ZANU-PF meddling'. What can citizens do when those with the mandate to rule have abdicated their responsibilities due to perceived overbearing external influence?

There is an old saying, 'the more things change the more they remain the same'. Despite all this citizens still expect the messiah (government) to come and rescue them and officeholders continue to make promises as if there is an appointed day where all the promises made will, through some form of magic or miraculous act; turn into tangible actions for the benefit of citizens. Yet, the multiple forms of the socio-economic crises continue to deepen leading others to yearn for the previous era.

1.1 Background

Zimbabwe has since the turn of the century been experiencing a multi-dimensional crisis caused by a malfunctioning state-led heterodox model which has fallen victim to lack of coherency, isolation from international financial circuits, corruption and parasitic state capture by a politically connected elite. The poorly managed transfer of land from the minority whites to black farmers has also affected agricultural performance, the entire agribusiness value chains and also broader confidence in Zimbabwe as an investment destination. This has resulted in an economic meltdown, runaway inflation, high levels of un- and under-employment and poverty.

Politically, the country remains in gridlock since the July 30, 2018 elections. The main opposition party continues to raise the illegitimacy of the current President based on claims that the elections were rigged. There continues to be growing country risk factors associated with perceived and real lack of adherence to human rights standards required under both domestic constitutional imperatives and state obligations under international human rights law. Repeated scenes of post-election violent reprisals to national protests effectively nullify the potency in the narrative of “the new dawn” as various pockets of the political and civic community have been on the receiving end of brute force from law enforcement agencies since August 1, 2018.

The current round of the crisis is due to weak economic performance and an incoherent return to a neoliberal framework. The short-term results since the current Minister of Finance are a runaway inflation of 529% as at December 2019, continued acute shortage of foreign currency and inconclusive re-engagement with global financial institutions. Unlike in 2008, the shops are still full, but consumers lack purchasing power. While prices of commodities are rated against the parallel exchange rate, incomes are not and have lagged behind. Having averaged 13.9% during the period of the Government of National Unity (2009-2012), real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth declined to average 1.3% per annum for the period 2013-2019, against the ZimAsset’s target of 7.3% annual growth¹. Table 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the characteristics of the crisis in different sectors of the economy:

¹ It was projected to decline by 6.5% in 2019.

Table 1: The Multifaceted Crisis in Zimbabwe

Dimension	Characteristics of the Crisis
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Levels of Unemployment Hyperinflation International isolation (sanctions) Acute shortage of foreign currency Weak or no economic growth as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) De-industrialization/Closure of Companies Limited Utilization of Factory Capacity Collapse of infrastructure High prices of goods Cash shortages Weak demands over goods
Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contestations over land reform and disagreements over the compensation model Land Reform induced decline/collapse of agricultural performance (2000-2008) Food crises/increase in number of food insecure households Shrinking of land under irrigation Shortage of productive inputs Climate change induced challenges
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shortage or unavailability of essential drugs Shortage of machines to carry out basic procedures Skills Migration (Doctors and Nurses) Poor remuneration for Doctor and Nurses New global pandemic
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Growth in population not matched by increase an increase in education infrastructure High levels of teacher absenteeism Skills Migration of highly qualified professionals Poor remuneration of teachers Shortage of textbooks Increasing numbers of school dropouts
Housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak or no supply of low-priced housing stock Increasing number of families on housing waiting lists Weak financing mechanisms to support the supply of housing especially for “Bottom of the Pyramid” based households Increasing prices of stands Increasing number of people living in informal settlements
Political and Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Polarization High levels of intolerance of dissenting views Weak or no respect for the rule of law Failure to manage succession within political parties Abuse of electoral processes Election based/related violence Increase in the number of citizen-based protests on government actions

In its 2018 elections manifesto, ZANU-PF pledged to improve health service delivery in line with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the year 2023 and ensure that treasury allocated at least 15% of the national budget to health care in line with the Abuja Declaration. However, the

2019 allocation towards healthcare was below 15%. Figure 1 below provides a detailed breakdown of the National budget towards health and childcare over the years. Critically, very little has been achieved since the July 2018 elections. There are widespread reports about the shortage of basic things like gloves, pain relief medicines, and widespread breakdown of machinery. Furthermore, the typhoid outbreak in Gweru in August 2018 and the cholera outbreak of September 2018 in Harare serve to demonstrate the challenges in health care and sanitation delivery.




Figure 1: Annual Budget (USD) Allocation to Health and Child Care Sector - Source: OpenBudgetZim

2. Methodology

The survey on Citizens' perceptions and expectations of the government conducted in November and December of 2019 was a follow-up survey of the initial baseline survey conducted in November and December of 2018. We collected data across all the 10 Administrative Provinces of Zimbabwe through random sampling. The representative sample size was calculated based on projected population figures for Zimbabwe from Worldometer, an on-line platform which shows live counters with real-time estimates of population-related statistical data as computed by the website's proprietary algorithm. Worldometer's elaboration of the latest United Nations data computed that by end of 2019 Zimbabwe's population was 14.65 million made up of 7.65 million females (52.2%) and 7.0 million (47.8%) males. Our sample focused on the adult population, those 18 years of age and above at the time of the interviews which stands at approximately 56.9% (8.34 million) of the total population, by virtue of eligibility to vote and consequently having capacity to contribute to public policy discourse. The target was to interview a total of 2 400 respondents as this is a representative sample of the adult population, we ended up interviewing 2 665 respondents spread across the country. The data is considered representative with a 95% confidence level, a 2% margin of error.

The interviewed respondents were randomly selected from within and around urban, peri-urban and rural Zimbabwe across the 10 Provinces, targeting a balance between the sexes (i.e. male and female) as well as age groups above 18 years. Sampling was also informed and directed by the preceding baseline survey carried out in 2018 to effectively measure progress or lack thereof. The questionnaires used were designed on SurveyMonkey; a digital survey platform and face-to-face interviews were administered by 40 Enumerators; four (4) in each Province who each had a target of interviewing 10 people per day for six (6) days.

3. Description of Sample

The tables and figures below provide a snapshot of the demographic profile of the citizens we spoke to across Zimbabwe. The sample was made up of 2 649 respondents of which 1 211 (45.72%) were males and 1 438 (54.28%) were females (see Figure 3a below). In the 2018 survey we had more males (51%) participating compared to females (49%) and concerns had been raised that according to ZimStats data there are more females than males. We were careful to correct the initial oversight in this survey.




Figure 3a: Respondents' Gender

3.1 Respondents' Age and Marital status

We spoke to citizens that are eligible to vote (18-65+). The biggest cohort (31.8%) of the responding citizens was made up of those aged between 26-35 years. According to Zimstats, the youth is made up of those who are 18-35 years of age. In our survey, we managed to speak to 1 368 (51.54%) respondents considered to be part of the youth. The second largest (25.21%) cohort is made up of young adults aged between 36 and 45 years. The population in Zimbabwe is very youthful and the distribution of respondents we have by age is somewhat similar to what is prevailing in the country.




Figure 3a: Age Profile of Respondents

The majority (50.53%) of the respondents are married followed by those who are single (35.09%). There is a small minority (7.47%) of divorced respondents and a slightly equal number of those who are widowed (6.91%). These figures potentially suggest that the country has lower divorce rates compared to other countries.




Figure 3b: Respondents' Marital Status

3.2 Literacy Levels

An overwhelming majority (99.02%) of those we spoke to can read and write. Only 26 (0.98%) indicated that they could neither read nor write (Figure 3c). These figures are mostly associated with developed economies especially Scandinavian countries. In many other African countries illiteracy rates are much higher than what prevails in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the majority (52%) of the respondents have attained education up to secondary level, suggesting that they have spent at least 13 years in a formal school environment (see Figure 3d). The second largest (43%) cohort are those who have attained tertiary education qualification.

Respondents' ability to read and write




Figure 3c: Ability to read and write

Respondents' Level of Education




Figure 3d: Highest level of education attained

3.3 Location of Respondents

The majority (75%) of the respondents reside in urban areas whilst 25.48% reside in rural areas (Table 3a). The distribution of respondents by area of residency does not unfortunately mirror the actual national pattern. Our intention was to ensure that we follow the national population distribution pattern as closely as we could. However, we faced unusual but significant challenges in trying to administer the questionnaire in the rural areas. We covered the following rural areas in our survey; Karoi, Chipinge, Shurugwi, Rusape, Beitbridge, Plumtree and Gokwe.

Table 3a: Do you live in a city/town or in a rural area?

Location	Percentage	Actual
City / Town	74.52%	1 971
Rural Area	25.48%	674
Total		2 645

3.4 Accommodation Arrangements

The largest cohort (38.37%) of respondents rent the houses they live in. The second largest cohort (33.28%) live with family or friends (Figure 3e). Less than one fifth (19.32%) of the respondents own their homes whilst about 3% are paying off mortgages. These findings suggest the fact that the majority of the respondents still have to cover monthly rental costs which can cause further strain on limited incomes. Upon further asking (Table 3c; Figure 3f) we learnt that the majority (47%) live in full houses and also about a third (27.89%) of the sample rent rooms in a house.

Citizens' Accommodation Arrangements




Figure 3e: Citizens' Accommodation Arrangements




Figure 3f: Citizens' accommodation type

3.5 Income Ranges

The majority (55.42%) of the respondents earn between ZWL 1 to ZWL 1,000.00 in each month (Figure 3g). The second largest cohort is made up of those who earn between ZWL 1,001.00 and ZWL 3,000.00. Less than 1% earn more than ZWL 15,000.00. These income levels are set against a background of hyperinflation which closed off at 529% in December 2019. When compared to US\$ those who earn between ZWL 1 to ZWL 500.00 were actually getting US\$ 1- US\$ 22.78 whilst those who earned ZWL 5,001.00 to ZWL 9,000.00 were actually earning between US\$ 278 to US\$ 500 per month. It is important to note that whilst government de-dollarised the economy in 2019, prices are still pegged according to the prevailing rate to the United States Dollar (USD) and in some instances, traders insist on USD payments only. The de-dollarisation process was not complemented by a review of salaries. The cost of living has increased significantly in the past months. The incomes described here are not necessarily in the form of wages acquired from formal sector employment they also refer to earning from informal sector activities. The Minister of Finance has been on the record assuring the country that he is dealing with excess liquidity. **Could it be that the measures in place have actually limited the flow of money and in the process depressed business?**

Monthly Income Levels of Respondents




Figure 3g: Monthly Income Levels of Respondents

4. Participation of Citizens in Public Policy Processes

One of the hallmarks of best practice in policy making entails engaging citizens in problem-solving through their participation. Different studies from other parts of the world have demonstrated how participation contributes to social cohesion and also improves the performance of the governing authority. Furthermore, meaningful participation motivates citizens to engage not as spectators but in the creation of public goods as well either through co-creation or complementary acting. In many instances, the participation has been reduced to processes of inviting citizens to discuss an already crafted document such as a budget or a new law. These measures are not necessarily adequate, but they provide scope and an appetite for citizens to be more involved. We asked respondents if they had been a part of any policy formulation process. The majority (60.18%) have never been involved whilst 39.82% confirmed that they have been a part of some consultation process. Those who have participated before were asked to describe the processes they were involved in (see Table 4a). The majority (58.27%) had been active at local government level in discussions on the performance of local authorities (26.43%) and consultations on improvement of service delivery (31.86%). Approximately a fifth (19.43%) of those who have been involved in public policy processes before have participated in budget consultations whilst only 6% were invited to make an input on the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP).

Table 4a: Policy Formulation Processes Citizens Engaged In

Process	Percentage	Actual
Budget approval	19.43%	211
Discussions on performance of local authorities	26.43%	287
Discussions on performance of central government	16.21%	176
Consultations on improvement of service delivery	31.86%	346
Economic development policies / TSP	6.08%	66
Total		1086

We found that the majority of those who have participated in policy formulation were those aged between 26-35 years (Figure 4a). However, when disaggregated by proportion with each age category we found that 73% (218 out of 298) of those aged between 18-25 years have participated in policy making processes compared to 38.42% (320 out of 513) in the 26-35 group. These figures challenge existing assumptions that young people (especially millennials) are disconnected from politics. There was no significant difference in participation by gender, 543 (38.05%) women confirmed to have been a part of policy consultations whilst 504 (42.1%) had also participated in policy processes (Figure 4b).

Participation in Policy Formulation by Age




Figure 4a: Participation in policy formulation processes by age

Participation in policy formulation processes by Gender




Figure 4b: Participation in policy formulation processes by Gender

The majority (59.44%) of the respondents think there is adequate scope to make an input into policy making (Figure 4c). It is important to note that this response includes people who have not participated in policy related consultations before. The finding suggests that citizens realize or know of the existence of such consultations but choose not to get involved. The response is also very important for those considering public consultations. Citizens are aware of the importance of such consultations but there is need to understand why they do not come when invited. Some of the issues could do with logistics and the timing of the consultations.

Citizens' perceptions on scope to make an input towards public policy processes




Figure 4c: Citizens' perceptions on scope to make an input towards public policy processes

5. Citizens and Local Government Processes

Beyond participation in processes such as public policy consultations we also sought to understand the extent to which citizens know their elected officials at ward and constituency level (Table 5a). The majority (76.97%) know their ward councillor. Slightly more than a fifth (23.03%) of the respondents do not know who their ward councillor. The assumptions about ward level politics and consultation has always been that the representative of the ward will mostly be a resident of the area to reduce the distance between residents and city hall.

Table 5a: Knowledge of Ward Councillor

Response	Percentage	Actual
Yes	76.97%	1 982
No	23.03%	593
Total		2 575

5.1 Performance of Local Authorities

In the survey we asked respondents to rate the performance of their local council around the provision of clean water, garbage disposal, housing, road network maintenance, healthcare, employment creation, electricity, and education. The largest cohort (36.5%) of respondents believe that the quality of service is bad and has declined from the pre-2018 standard (Figure 5a). The second largest cohort (28.62%) of respondents stated that the service is very bad and close to non-existent. The bad to non-existent category recorded the highest response when we asked citizens to score their local authorities on employment creation and electricity. It is important to note that local authorities are not responsible for the supply of electricity. Slightly over a quarter (25.13%) of the respondents were of the opinion that service delivery at local government has remained the same. The three sets of responses discussed so far are on the negative side of the bar on performance- they demonstrate varying levels of dissatisfaction. The majority of the respondents (on average 89.93%) disapprove of the quality of local service delivery. Only 10% of the respondents think that either the quality of service has moderately increased or increased a lot. Figures 5b -5f provide detailed responses of citizens across traditional local authority service areas.




Figure 5a: Overall Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery

There is a very small minority which believes that delivery of clean water has either increased a lot (3.24%) or moderately increased (11.17%). The majority either think that water provision has remained the same (30.47%) or it has decreased (34.22). Approximately a fifth of the respondents (20.9%) believe that water provision is very bad or non-existent (Figure 5b).




Figure 5b: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Clean Water Provision

The trend is more or less similar with the above when it comes to Garbage Collection and Disposal. Only 15.88% of respondents rated garbage collection and disposal positively. A very small minority (2.30%) believe that it has increased a lot and 13.58% believe that it has moderately increased. On the other hand, there were 32.99% of respondents who believe that it has remained the same, 34.22% who believe that it has decreased and 16.91% who think service delivery in this area does not exist at all (Figure 5c).




Figure 5c: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Garbage Collection and Disposal

The majority of respondents (41%) also felt that provision of housing had not significantly changed from the previous era (see Figure 5d below). Only 1.04% feel that the provision of housing has increased a lot and 7.52% feel that it has moderately increased. On the other hand, 27.91% think it has decreased while 22.35% think that service provision in this area is close to non-existent. It is important to note that ahead of the 2018 general election, ZANU-PF made a pledge to build 1.5 million homes in the five-year period leading up to 2023. The 1.5 million five-year housing plan would have required building of an average of 300,000 houses per year.




Figure 5d: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Provision of Housing

Similar trends continue in the areas of road network maintenance, provision of health services and provision of education. The findings point to a general picture of dissatisfaction amongst respondents on the way councils operate and their performance levels. The Figures below provide a detailed breakdown on how citizens perceive of councils’ performance in the maintenance of roads, provision of health




Figure 5e: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Road Network Maintenance

Figure 5f: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Provision of Health Services




Figure 5f: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Provision of Health Services

Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Provision of Education




Figure 5g: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery – Provision of Education

We have also analysed service provision by city as per the Figures (5h-5l) below. Whilst there is no positively rated city, the respondents in Bulawayo feel that service delivery has remained somewhat the same from the previous era compared across many areas. In Harare, many residents feel that service delivery is mostly non-existent (provision of clean water) or decreased (garbage disposal, and health delivery). Bulawayo also scores poorly on health delivery where the majority of respondents feel that services have either decreased or are now non-existent. In Mutare the majority believe that the provision of clean water, garbage disposal and education have largely remained the same. The same respondents rated health care delivery as having significantly decreased. In Gweru, the majority felt that service delivery has remained the same in the following areas: clean water provision, garbage

collection and disposal and delivery of education. When it comes healthcare the majority of the citizens, we spoke to feel that services have decreased significantly.

Rating of Clean Water Provision by Local Councils Across Five Cities




Figure 5h: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery across Five Cities – Provision of Clean Water

Rating of Garbage Collection and Disposal by Local Councils Across Five Cities




Figure 5i: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery across Five Cities – Garbage Collection and Disposal

Rating of Provision of Housing by Local Councils Across Five Cities




Figure 5j: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery across Five Cities – Provision of Housing

Rating of Provision of Health Care by Local Councils Across Five Cities




Figure 5k: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery across Five Cities – Provision of Health Care

Rating of Provision of Education by Local Councils Across Five Cities




Figure 5l: Rating of Quality of Local Service Delivery across Five Cities – Provision of Education

5.2 Citizens Priorities in Local Service Delivery

The survey also sought to understand citizens' expectations on local service delivery. In a question that allowed for multiple responses the largest cohort of responses (82.08%) stated that they want their local authorities to prioritize ensuring regular supply of water followed by 58.86% of respondents who raised the need for councils to ensure that clinics are fully functional and well-equipped (Table 5b, Figure 5n). The third largest (46.38%) cohort were focused on the need for regular road maintenance. The majority of these issues have been raised in previous studies (see SIVIO, 2019). In the 2018 survey the largest cohort also raised the need for the regular supply of clean water as a top priority.

CITIZENS' SERVICE DELIVERY PRIORITIES




Figure 5m: Citizens' Service Delivery Priorities

5. 3 Factors Inhibiting Councils' Effectiveness

The majority (79%) of the citizens think that acts of corruption play a major role in inhibiting service delivery (see Figure 5n). Other factors inhibiting service delivery include incompetence by officeholders (46.44%), inadequate resources (41.92%) meddling by central government (37.41%), lack of appropriate oversight by councillors (35.73%) and lack of oversight by residents (22.5%). These findings are similar to what we found in the 2018 survey carried out across similar areas. Many of the citizens still believe that corruption is the biggest factor inhibiting service delivery. The findings also suggest that government's rhetoric against corruption has not yet yielded significant results.




Figure 5n: Factors Inhibiting the Effectiveness of Local Councils

6. Perceptions of Central Government's Performance

We asked citizens to rank the performance of central government using three categories, high (exceeds expectations), medium (satisfactory) and low (poor). The majority (90%) felt that the overall performance was low (see Figure 6a below). There is a general sense of disappointment with government's performance. In our previous survey carried a few months after the elections 65% had ranked government's performance as low. The increase from 65% to 90% suggests growing dissatisfaction with government performance. It is important to reiterate that the 'austerity for prosperity' policy coupled with drought induced food shortages did not endear many to the government.

Overall Performance of Central Government




Figure 6a: Overall Performance of Central Government

6.1 Rating of Government's Performance in Specific Areas

We also asked citizens to rate government's performance across a number of areas; creation of jobs, stability of prices, health care delivery, education, nation building and infrastructure development (Figure 6b). Leading to the 2018 elections, the President and the ruling party's campaign had made a commitment towards the creation of jobs. The majority (93%) of the respondents feel that government has performed poorly in this area. In fact, government has performed poorly across all the areas under discussion. For instance, 93% feel that

government has not been able to create an environment of stable prices (inflation was at 529% by December 2019). In terms of healthcare delivery, 88% feel that government's performance has been poor. The government has also performed poorly in the areas of nation building and infrastructure development. It is only in education delivery where we have approximately a third (29%) of respondents that say the performance by government has been medium but still 65% feel that the performance is very poor.




Figure 6b: Citizens' Perceptions on Central Government Performance

6.2 Citizens' Perceptions on Availability of Resources

We asked citizens if they think that government has sufficient resources to effectively carry out its mandate. The majority (59.82%) feel that government has adequate resources to carry out its mandate whilst 40.18% feel that it does not have the resources (see Figure 6c). We added this question to gauge if citizens agree with government's excuse that it is hamstrung by sanctions to carry out its mandate effectively. The findings here suggest that government's explanations on the effect of sanctions has not been totally effective. However, it could also be due to the fact that the Minister of Finance has on many occasions expressed confidence in the measures that he has put in place for revenue collection especially the 2% transaction tax.

Perceptions of government resource capacity to implement or address issues




Figure 6c: Citizens' perceptions of government resource capacity to implement or address issues

6.3 Factors Inhibiting Government's Effectiveness

We asked citizens to identify factors that inhibit or limit government's effectiveness. The majority (81.40%) cited corruption as the main cause behind government's failure to effectively execute its tasks (see Figure 6d below). In this instance the citizens are in agreement with the head of state. On many occasions the President has also complained about the scourge of corruption and how it affects not only government but the moral fibre of society. The second largest (47.5%) group of responses cited ineffective leadership as the main cause behind government's ineptitude. Other factors that were cited include incompetence (42.08%), lack of political will to carry out reforms (41.2%) and limited financial resources (33.93%). It is important to note that the top four factors cited by citizens are mostly internal challenges except for limited financial resources. The dominant narrative on the part of the ruling party has been that sanctions (shortage of financial resources) have been the drivers of economic decline.

PERCEPTIONS ON FACTORS INHIBITING GOVERNMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS




Figure 6d: Perceptions on Factors Inhibiting Government's Effectiveness

6.4 Citizens' Suggestions on Government Priorities

We asked citizens to suggest priorities for the government. The majority (62.93%) of the respondents think that government should come up with measures to stabilise prices (see Fig 6.e). At the time of data collection inflation was in the region of +500% and in many instances' salaries had not increased in line with the inflationary pressures. The second largest (51.28%) cohort think that government should focus on dealing with corruption and the third priority should be on fixing cash shortages. The fourth largest cohort suggested that government should focus on resuscitating industry. These four priorities have to do with the state of the economy and also suggest citizens' realization about the need to take a lead on fixing the economy.

Citizens' Suggestions on Government priorities for the next six months




Figure 6e: Citizens' Suggestions on Government priorities for the next six months

6.5 Citizens' Perceptions of What Government's Success Should Like

We asked citizens to paint a picture of success. Remarkably their ideas of success revolve around socio-economic wellbeing. The largest cohort (65.60%) felt that success will have been achieved when the prices of goods are stable and affordable. The second largest (62.05%) set of responses suggested that success will have been achieved if industries are re-opening. The third (60.65%) felt that success will be when clinics and hospitals are operating optimally. The fourth felt that success will have been achieved if and when government has effectively dealt with corruption (Figure 6f).




Figure 6f: Citizens' measure of a successful government

7. Conclusion

The findings suggest a general sense of despondency and disappointment with both local authorities and central government. There is no single area that one can identify as possible cases of best practice. In the meantime, the socio-economic conditions have worsened across the country exacerbated by the poor rains which negatively affected agriculture. There is no significant traction on attracting foreign direct investment- the number of unemployed has been on the increase. In other words, the crisis continues unabated with very limited prospects for recovery. At the time of writing the country is in the midst of preparations for a possible spread of the COVID-19, a further strain on an already stretched national purse. Could this be the time for the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to rethink some of its policies? Despite efforts at re-engaging the international community, very little foreign direct investment has trickled in. A number of policy reforms have been carried out especially around land. First, the GoZ has re-committed to paying compensation to former large-scale commercial farmers for improvements on the farms and compensation for land and improvements to former Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (BIPPA) farms. Second, they have removed the need for local ownership of mines. Third, the government in 2019 paid off its debt to the International Monetary Fund.

All these measures have proved to be insufficient. The violent crackdown on protesters soon after elections in 2018 and also in January 2019 seem to have negatively affected the reputation of the government before they had even settled down. The failure to account for public resources such as the debacle around the US\$3 billion lost through Command Agriculture has also served to fuel thinking that nothing has changed in terms of public accountability. This government still has a lot of work to convince its own citizens and also the international community that they are actually about reforms and turning around the fortunes of the countries. There is need to urgently address the systematic causes of the crisis by ensuring that there is improved accountability on how public resources are being utilized. Government needs to reorient towards a more pro-poor policy framework by ensuring that the 2% collected from citizens is redirected towards improving social policy performance. The re-engagement efforts especially the settling of international debts should not be done at the expense of national wellbeing. Instead the government pursue debt rescheduling agreements that contribute towards creation of a fiscal space for economic recovery.

About SIVIO Institute

SIVIO Institute (SI) is an independent organisation focused on ensuring that citizens are at the centre of processes of economic-political-economic and policy change. It aims to contribute towards Zimbabwe's inclusive socio-economic transformation. It is borne out of a desire to enhance agency as a stimulus/catalyst for inclusive political and socio-economic transformation. SIVIO's work entails multi-disciplinary, cutting-edge policy research, nurturing citizens' agency to be part of the change that they want to see, working with communities to mobilize their assets to resolve some of the immediate problems they face.

SIVIO Institute has three centres/programs of work focused on; (i) public policy analysis and advocacy (ii) philanthropy and communities (ii) entrepreneurship and financial inclusion. In the process SI addresses the following problems:

- Inadequate performance of existing political and economic system
- Increasing poverty and inequality
- Limited coherence of policies across sectors
- Ineffectual participation in public processes by non-state actors
- Increased dependence on external resources and limited leveraging of local resources

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